In a laboratory experiment involving

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The key takeaway in the paper Career incentives far from selecting the wrong types attract talented workers to the public sector who deliver health services effectively. But there s another takeaway for Ashraf whose current research involves co producing studies with urban planners in sub Saharan Africa. We show academics that you can actually generate good science while also having impact on good policy she says even though it s a little more labor intensive and might take longer. POST A COMMENTDecision Making.

Under Information Asymmetry Experimental Evidence on Belief Refinements by William Schmidt and Ryan W. Buell Managers often have to make decisions in settings where they know more about the prospects of their firm than other parties and care about how the less informed party responds to their decisions. For instance a manager may care about Chinese Overseas America Number Data how the stock market responds to the firm s expansion plans. In such situations the manager s decision may signal the firm s prospects to the less informed party. This phenomenon has been researched in a variety of situations including new product and service introductions competitive entry supplier contracts and capacity investments. A common assumption in researching such issues is that managers will make decisions that perfectly reveal the firm s prospects to the less informed party even if it is costly to do so. For example a firm facing a big market opportunity will open more stores than is optimal in order to signal its favorable prospects.





The number of stores the firm opens must be so high that a firm facing a small opportunity will find it too expensive to mimic the number of store openings. While such predicted outcomes underpin much of the operations theory developed in these settings they have not been reconciled against the decisions made by actual decision makers.  more than participants the researchers conduct such an analysis. Their findings offer the first evidence that decision makers choose not to make decisions that reveal the firm s market opportunity and instead make the same decision regardless of the firm s prospects.